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Tommy Burns as a 
Military Leader 
A Case Study using 
Integrative Complexity 
J .L. Granatstein and Peter Suedfeld 
L ieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns is relatively well-known to Canadian 
military historians and to Canadians 
generally. A professional soldier born in 
1897, Tommy Burns attended the Royal 
Military College, leaving before graduation to 
serve with the Canadian Corps in France and 
Flanders during the Great War. He saw much 
action, won the Military Cross, and decided to 
remain in the tiny Canadian Permanent Force 
after the Armistice. Burns rose with rapidity 
in the interwar years, his career helped by 
brilliant performance at the British Army 
Staff College, Quetta, and selection for the 
Imperial Defence College, London. He had 
powerful patrons, senior officers such as Harry 
Crerar who admired his intelligence and skills 
as a staff officer, traits that occasionally 
camouflaged his sarcasm and lack of 
traditional leadership qualities of the kind 
that can make men willing to follow an officer 
into battle. 
At the same time, Burns' restless mind 
was searching for other outlets. He began 
writing articles in H.L. Mencken's American 
Mercury, the magazine of the 1920s. He 
published a play and a novel, and he wrote 
sketches for the theatre. And at the same 
time, the Canadian Defence Quarterly, the 
military's one interwar intellectual outlet, 
featured a stimulating debate on the use of 
armour between Burns and a young captain, 
Guy Simonds, who was to develop into the 
best general Canada was to produce in World 
War II. Burns, in other words was a man of 
parts. 
At the outbreak of war in 1939, Lieutenant-
Colonel Burns was in Britain attending the 
Imperial Defence College. He soon had himself 
attached to the Canadian High Commission, 
preparing for the arrival of the first Canadian 
contingent. In mid-1940 he returned to 
Canada to work for the new Chief of the 
General Staff, General Crerar, as a colonel, 
and the next year he took the plum position 
of Brigadier General Staff to Lieutenant-
General A.G.L. McNaughton, commanding 
the Canadian Corps in the United Kingdom. 
Burns' career was on the rise-until postal 
censors in May 1941 intercepted mail to his 
mistress in Montreal and took exception to 
some of Brigadier Burns' views about the 
war, British commanders, and Canadian 
attitudes. Returned to Canada in disgrace, 
Burns narrowly escaped court-martial though 
he was reduced in rank to colonel. 
Such a blow might have finished the career 
of a lesser man, but Burns rose again to 
become a brigade commander, a division 
commander in Britain and in Italy, and then 
in early 1944 commander ofl Canadian Corps 
as it fought its way up the Italian boot. 
Burns' men helped break the Hitler Line and 
successfully cracked the Gothic Line, major 
battles that ought to have made his reputation. 
It was not to be. Burns never got on with his 
"huntin' and fishin'" British superiors, and 
his personality failed to impress itself on 
either his division commanders or his troops. 
A British attempt to get rid of him in July 
1944 was blocked only be a major effort on 
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the part of General Crerar, commanding First 
Canadian Army, who despatched the Chief of 
Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters, 
London, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, 
to Italy to investigate. Stuart did so, talking 
not only to British officers but also discussing 
Burns' performance with his subordinates. A 
second attempt to oust Burns, this one 
initiated by his senior Canadian field and 
staff officers in October 1944, was more 
successful, and Burns, relieved of his 
command and reduced in rank to major-
general at the beginning of November, spent 
the final months of the war in unimportant 
rear area positions. 
After the war, Burns worked for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs in Ottawa, 
ultimately becoming its deputy minister, and 
then as commander of the United Nations 
Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine. 
In November 1956, in the midst of the Suez 
Crisis, he created the United Nations 
Emergency Force that helped restore a kind 
of peace to the Egyptian-Israeli border. His 
reputation on the rise again, Burns regained 
his rank of lieutenant-general and in 1960 
became Canada's Ambassador for 
Disarmament. By the time of his death in 
1986, he was a much revered figure.' 
Most of this is reasonably well-known, 
not least through Burns' own voluminous (if 
relatively discreet) contemporaneous and 
autobiographical writings. 2 But what was 
going through his mind when he was writing 
in crisis? What if we could assess his ability 
to make decisions and to process the flood of 
information that fell upon him at the crucial 
points in his career? Moreover, what if we 
could compare how Burns acted in crisis and 
how he wrote about it later? 
Military leadership and its failings have 
always fascinated scholars. Consider N.F. 
Dixon's well-known On the Psychology of 
Military Incompetence (London, 1979) which 
looked devastatingly at British commanders 
of the last two hundred years. To Dixon, 
neurotic authoritarians were virtually doomed 
to fail as leaders because of their obstinate 
rigidity, their compulsive desire for control, 
their inability to cope with dissonance, and 
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their stubborn anti-intellectualism. 
Psychologists quarrel with the lack of 
empirical rigidity in Dixon's analyses, but 
they note approvingly that he recognized that 
personality characteristics interact with 
environmental factors. Dixon talked about 
the information overload that frequently 
overwhelms commanders, and he understood 
that biological and physical factors, not least 
illness and sensory impairment, affect 
decision-making. Can Dixon be taken a step 
further? 
Psychologists who have studied cognitive 
functioning and decision-making have 
developed ways of measuring what they call 
integrative complexity. Integrative complexity, 
roughly definable as the ability to process 
information, ranges from rigid, egocentric, 
poorly differentiated judgements at the simple 
end of the continuum to flexible, integrative 
and empathetic responses at the complex 
end. Such a tool can readily be applied to 
political leadership in international crises3 
and to generalship. 4 The complexity of a 
commanders, we may hypothesize, is related 
to the likelihood that he will be influenced by 
other matters as well. These include the 
strength of his own and the opposing forces 
and the skills-not least in information-
processing-of the commander on the other 
side of the hill. 
At the simplest end of the complexity 
continuum, we might expect to find a rigid, 
authoritarian officer, one who "goes by the 
book" and acts without considering all 
available information and all possible plans. 
Is this necessarily self-defeating? Perhaps, 
but not necessarily so. there are situation in 
which this approach could be the most 
adaptive. It allows rapid decision-making 
and, with obvious self-confidence, it 
concentrates on a few salient issues and 
items of information, and allows for no 
vacillation or weakness. C.S. Foresters' 
fictional character in The General is a perfect 
prototype. 
A highly complex commander, on the other 
hand, will seek out and process much more 
information, develop and monitor plans more 
flexibly and creatively, and be better able to 
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anticipate the reactions of his opponent. His 
weaknesses may include an unwillingness to 
stop searching for information and to make a 
firm decision, being led astray by minor bits 
of information, and the appearance of being 
unsure of his own mind. 
The implications of studying integrative 
complexity should be clear. If the 
psychologists are correct in their approach, 
we might expect that innovativeness, tactical 
flexibility, an ability to read the apparent 
tactical plans and mind of the opponent, and 
a willingness to seek out information and to 
consider it seriously will be very helpful to a 
commander with a high level of complexity. 
Skill at information processing, in other words, 
can bring victory, especially against a superior 
foe or when a difficult situation requires an 
especially creative approach. By the same 
token, the virtues associated with a low level 
of complexity-doggedness, a refusal to 
consider being distracted by too much 
information, and a penchant for a 
straightforward strategy-might well lead to 
success in some campaigns. 
But how can we measure integrative 
complexity retroactively? In fact, although 
they are virtually unknown to historians, 
many studies by psychologist have done so, 
Above and Below: Lieutenant -GeneralE.L.M. "Tommy" 
Bums in Italy, March 1944. 
taking samples of the subject's writing and 
scoring they paragraph by paragraph along a 
scale with nodal points of 1 (very low 
differentiation), 3 (differentiation, no 
integration), 5 (differentiation, some 
integration), and 7 (high levels of 
differentiation and integration). Transitional 
scores (2, 4 or 6) are assigned to passages 
that show some aspects of the next higher 
nodal score but do not clearly meet the criteria 
for that score. Any connected verbal discourse 
can be scored for integrative complexity in 
this way, and trained scorers can do the task 
with a high degree of inter-scorer agreement. 5 
Table 1 gives an example of Burns' writing at 
each of the four main nodal points. 
With Burns we are fortunate to have both 
material he wrote contemporaneously as well 
as memoirs written some 15 years later. This 
allows analysis and comparison of Burns' 
three major professional crises during the 
1941-1945 period: his near court-martial in 
65 
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Table 1 
Examples of Complexity Scoring 
One point of view, dismissal of opposing 
perspective. Score=l 
"Captain Hart sets down a myopic argument 
to the effect that Foch was converted from the 
"Napoleonic fallacy" and led to give more 
importance to "economic objectives" by the 
experience in the Ruhr. How a "war" in which 
one of the combatants had no army (or none 
to speak of) can prove anything about war in 
general, I am unable to see." (from Burns' 
review of B.H. Lidell Hart's the remaking of 
Modern Armies in Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, October 1927.) 
Consideration of different aspects and 
dimensions, acceptance of conflict or 
disagreement. Score=3 
"In the space available I have not been able to 
deal fully with the "Napoleonic fallacy" theory, 
but no doubt enough has been said-perhaps 
too much- for this chapter in Captain Hart's book 
is only 23 pages of 312, and the rest is invariably 
sensible, persuasive, and full of suggestive ideas. 
Particularly interesting are the chapters on light 
tanks, gas, infantry tactics, and training ... 'The 
Dominions and Mechanisation" should excite a 
good deal of argument. Capt. Hart suggests that as 
the purpose of the Dominion forces is primarily 
defensive, motortsed machine gun battalions would 
give a more valuable return for the money expended 
than the present orthodox though only partially 
organized forces of all arms." (Ibid.) 
1941, the British criticism of his leadership 
in June 1944, and the revolt of his division 
commanders in September-October 1944.6 
In the first of these, Burns' personal 
indiscretion in 1941, we find increased 
complexity in correspondence he wrote at the 
time. This reaction, commonly found among 
outstanding men facing such crises, reflects 
a mustering of intellectual resources to 
consider the dimensions and details of a 
problem and how to solve it. 7 Upon 
reinstatement ofthe upward path of his career, 
66 
Synthesis of two contradictory aims by a 
combined solution. Score=5 
'The solution to these opposed requirements is to 
advance on a broad front and concentrate the 
attack. The extent of front on which it is possible to 
attack is usually determined by the number of guns 
and tanks available; but it should be as wide as 
possible, consistent with effective neutralisation of 
the enemy Small Arms and mortar fire and 
adequate tank support." (Burns' "Notes on 
Tactical Methods," October 1944.) 
Consideration of different dimensions, 
combined solution using higher-order 
categorization schemata.' Score=7 
"It must be remembered that as the fighting troops 
are increasingly composed of reinforcement who 
have not had company and platoon training, nor 
training in co-operation with tanks, the type of 
operation must be simplified. Highly trained troops 
can fight their way forward, by companys, calling 
down artillery concentrations and making plans to 
overcome each situation, and this can frequently be 
done with small losses. But when most of the troops 
are only partially trained simplicity must be the 
keynote, together with heavy fire support. The 
simplest form of attack is for the infantry and tanks 
to follow a heavy barrage closely, going straight 
through to an objective, only clearing out the enemy 
lying directly in the path. But this must be combined 
with thorough mopping up." (Ibid.) 
Burns' complexity level also went up, the 
result of coping successfully with the new 
and complicated problems he faced and 
mastered as a brigade and division 
commander. 
His complexity then decreased during his 
time as Corps commander, a time of almost 
constant professional criticism from his 
British superiors. Burns' decline appeared 
in his first experience as a Corps commander 
in action, the confusion and heavy casualties 
of the May 1944 attack on the Hitler Line. It 
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became worse when his leadership came under 
attack from Generals Leese and Alexander, 
criticism so severe that he had to replace 
several of his staff officers while his own 
position was saved only by the extraordinary 
exertions of his Canadian superiors. 
Complexity reduction during such periods of 
ongoing stress and declining resources to 
continue dealing with such stress is predicted 
by both stress and complexity theories. 8 And 
no wonder. A similar pattern was found in 
the complexity changes of General Robert E. 
Lee as he endured fatigue, failure and ever-
diminishing resources during the period from 
July 1863 to April 1864 as the American Civil 
War turned against the South. 9 
Burns' complexity increased during 
professional success as pressures and stress 
eased between July and September 1944. 
His I Canadian Corps successfully attacked 
the Gothic Line in September and for a time 
Burns basked in the praise of his superiors. 
Unfortunately for Burns, his senior 
commanders turned on him in October and 
forced his ouster. This release from stress led 
to increased complexity in October 1944. 
Again, General Lee's complexity followed a 
similar pattern as he came to accept the need 
to surrender at Appomattox. 
Burns' memoirs consistently showed a 
higher complexity than his writings during 
the war, but his retrospective account followed 
the same general trends of increase and 
decrease. This is an interesting indication 
that reflecting upon past events can evoke 
reactions similar to those at the time, but-in 
relation to crises, at least-perhaps with 
greater attention, and a better understanding 
of the behaviour of the other protagonists. 
Burns was an unusually intelligent and 
thoughtful officer, of course; whether the 
memoirs of those who did not share such 
characteristics would show the same effects 
from retrospection remains to be studied. 
While there has been a substantial body 
of work on political leaders and civilian elites, 
relatively little work has been devoted to 
studying how battlefield commanders handle 
the information they get and upon which they 
base their decisions. The importance of their 
tactical and strategic choices is obviously 
vital, not only to the soldiers under their 
command but sometimes to the fate of their 
countries. Integrative complexity scoring, a 
technique which can be used at a distance, 
from available documentary sources, and at 
any time during and after an event, seems a 
technique that historians might profitably 
employ. 
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